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Abstract
This paper examines the intrusion of political system on performance of Indian firms,
employing state and constituency level financial borrowing panel data by firms from domestic
banks from 2010 to 2015. Using conditional logistic and fixed effects regression models, the
results suggests that firms located in regions aligned politically with the ruling party enjoy
possible preferential access to financing from banks. We find average productivity efficiency
loss of 2.77% in the short term as a result of politically motivated redistribution of scarce
capital. These political effects are statistically robust to the inclusion of region fixed effects,
time fixed effects and other socio-economic factors.
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1. Introduction
The allocation of grants from central to state government to mitigate the gap between revenue
and expenditure assignment permits the center to pursue various objectives. While majority of
the traditional literature on fiscal federalism discusses these objectives, it always assumes that
the central government is interested in maximizing social welfare. But there is limited evidence
that government intervention in markets may improve welfare. On the other hand, there is
convincing evidence that government institutions are subject to political capture.
Most of the recent literature on political economy emphasizes the interference of
government in institutional functioning through two major theoretical frameworks: the
political business cycles and redistributive politics. These theories focus on the supply of
resources in certain political landscapes. This paper contributes to the existing literature by
undertaking empirical analysis of the impact of the dynamics of political alliances on bank
lending in India from firms perspective, considering that firms are heterogeneous in nature. We
assume that a politician maximizes her utility by getting re-elected and hence is prone to usage
of her influence on institutions.

2. Literature Review
In a country like India which has strong institutional roots based on the British Legal and
Political system, it is interesting and intriguing to study the use and mis-use of the government
institutions by ruling political parties. We intend to specifically focus on the government
financial institutions like nationalized banks (more than 50% of the ownership is with
government) in India. These banks are mostly used as a medium to implement the desired fiscal
policies of the government.
Studying manufacturing firms is important in the context of a developing country like
India. Analyzing economic development across the world, Kuznets (1971) documents a strong
correlation between manufacturing sector’s contribution to GDP and economic growth.
Resource misallocation, including differential access to bank loans, can play an important role
in explaining the differences in efficiency which can be measured by output per worker. Hsieh
and Klenow (2009) in their paper, provide quantitative evidence on the potential impact of
resource misallocation on aggregate TFP in China and India.

2.1 Theories and Tests
2.1.1 Political Business Cycles
The theories of political business cycles predict that politicians manipulate policy tools
around elections either to fool the voters or to signal their ability. The findings of Shi and
Svensson (2006) suggest that fiscal cycles are more pronounced in countries in which
institutions protecting property rights are weaker and voters are less informed. Although the
link between political business cycles during elections and budget deficit need not however,
imply that politicians behave opportunistically. Stuti Khemnani (2004) analyzed political
budget cycles in Indian states and found no evidence of presence of political cycles.

2.1.2 Politically Motivated Redistribution
The theory of politically motivated redistribution involves two different aspects one is
patronage redistribution and the other regarding tactical redistribution to achieve political
goals (Dixit and Londregan, 1996, Snyder, 1989, Cox and McCubbins, 1986). The theory of
patronage redistribution awarding areas in which the ruling party enjoys more support a
disproportionate amount of resources, irrespective of electoral goals. Tactical redistribution on
the other hand predicts resource allocation will follow one of two patterns: resources might be
targeted towards swing districts, or politicians will disproportionately reward their supporters.
Many a times it’s hard to collect the data on tactical redistribution and empirical testing of the
above theories becomes hard. Dahlberg and Johansson (2002) studied a grant program in
Sweden, in which the incumbent government had control over which constituencies received
the grant. They find strong evidence that money was targeted to constituencies where swing
voters were located. Imai (2009) proposes an underlying assumption for the opportunistic
behavior of politician that the longer a politician stays in power the more influence she has on
institutions. His paper estimates the effects of tenure of a leader, win margin at prefecture level
on impact on lending done by government financial institutions in Japan. The study highlights
that firms which belong to a region where the governing political party enjoys majority gets
more loans from government owned banks which too an extent explains the poor performance
of these financial institutions. However, he points out that the economic interpretation of such
results might not be as clear as if taken at face value.

India operates a multi-party political system which creates more complexities while
designing policies. Many a time’s governments are formed by coalition between multiple
political parties with different ideologies at center and state level. In a close election the
importance of smaller political parties and swing states increases. Dasgupta et al (2004) showed
the opportunistic nature of central government in India by constructing a “model of
redistributive politics”. The underlying theory tested in this paper is how the incumbent party
at the center can use center-state transfers to promote the electoral prospects of the party by
spreading goodwill among voters for the incumbent party at the center. They find that swing
states in India were allocated significantly large grants from central government compared to
states which consistently followed one political ideology over a period a long time.

2.2 Government Ownership of Banks
The Indian banking sector is regulated by the Reserve Bank of India which is the central bank.
It enjoys complete autonomy in regards to setting up of rules and regulations governing the
banks and also the monetary policy. Although this is the case all the nationalized banks where
the government of India has more than 50% ownership enjoys the authority to employee
selection. This in itself may give rise to misuse of such financial institutions during the election
years by influencing banks to have more liberal policy of loan forgiveness and restructuring of
bad loans. Also many a times the government identifies priority sectors of the economy which
get preferential treatment in terms of availability of credit. To analyze such effects of
government ownership of banks requires individual loan contracts data which is highly
sensitive in nature in India’s case and is rarely available in public domain. On such study by
Paola Sapienza (2002) finds that state owned banks in Italy charged lower interest rates than
privately owned banks to similar identical firms where the political party affiliated with the
bank was strong and the lending behavior of the state owned banks is affected by the electoral
results. La Porta et al (2002) document that government ownership of the banks is associated
with lower subsequent growth as most of the time these banks finance projects which are
financially may not be feasible but may help economic development. In a developing country
the redistribution of capital which is a scarce resource might have long term negative effects
than positive for overall economic development. Barth et al (1999) provide further empirical
evidence that the government ownership of bank results in low level of financial development.

A question that arises naturally from the government ownership of the banks is: given
that it is a politician that controls the government, are the actions of these banks influenced by
political concerns? Do they behave differently during the election year? Dinc (2002) in a cross
country analysis finds that government owned banks increase their lending in election years
relative to private banks.

2.3 Politicians and Firms
Democratically elected governments have a mandate to ensure economic well-being of their
citizens. Political considerations, however, can influence government’s decision making. Most
of the attention, however, is geared towards macroeconomic and fiscal policies, especially
around elections. Economic costs of such policy manipulations are often not clear. An
important question that arises is do politicians directly interfere with firm activity? Links
between politicians and firms is common across the world. Faccio (2006) documents political
connections in over 74% of the countries in her sample. Economists have suggested two
potential consequences of politically connected firms. Firstly, such firms might benefit from
their political connection to avail politically channeled loans and contracts and other regulatory
benefits. Fisman (2001) finds that 38% of firms on Jakarta stock exchange were closely
connected to President Suharto. Khwaja and Mian (2005) find that 23% of firms that received
corporate loans in Pakistan had politicians sitting on their board. Second, politicians may
extract benefits from firms. Shleifer and Vishny (1994) theoretically predict that firms linked to
politicians will get preferential treatment as such firms expand employment to garner votes in
their respective constituencies.
Post-independence, the political canvas was dominated by National Congress which has
its roots in the independence movement which was initiated by the Indian National Congress.
The public image of a politician is still looked at as someone who wants to serve people and not
work for his or her personal priorities and aspiration. To maintain such public image many
times a web of shell companies is used by politicians to control firms. Proving any direct or
indirect link between politician and firms is as hard as it can get. Sukhtankar (2012)
investigates an alternative mechanism through which politicians may benefit electorally from
connected firms by examining the sugar mills in India which are mostly controlled by
politicians. He finds that these sugar mills were used for embezzlement during election years

for election funding and further points out that in during election years farmers were paid
lower prices for cane. His findings in a way complement the theory of tactical redistribution of
resource to maximize electoral gains. Asher and Novosad (2015) carried out a much broader
analysis of performance of firms located in a constituency represented by a politician who is
aligned with the coalition. The paper shows that firms in India perform significantly better
when represented by politicians who are aligned with the coalition in control of the state
government. Also firms in coalition-aligned constituencies increase employment one
percentage point more per year over a seven year period. This support the theory of
redistributive politics and the theoretical proposition made by Shleifer et al (1994) that
politicians may extract benefits for links to firms as firms expand employment to garner votes
for connected politician.
Another question arising from the fact that firms often donate for electoral campaign is
that: do firms get any policy or regulatory benefits? Claessens et al (2008) used the campaign
contribution data from Brazil to construct indicators of political connection of firms. The
findings of this paper suggest that the contributions help shape policy on a firm specific rather
than ideological basis. They also found that these contributing firms also increased their
financial leverage compared to the firms which did not contribute.
The literature is abundant with empirical research quantifying the political
determinants of government owned banks in various countries. The effects of links between
politicians and firms on redistribution of resources are not so clear due to data constraints. Also
as mentioned earlier India has got a multi-party political system with some parties competing
only in the central elections and some only compete in province (state) elections. This creates a
highly dynamic political scenario with different bargaining strategies to satisfy their political
interests. Given the opportunistic nature of political parties one can argue that as the number of
years spent being a part of government either at center or state (Province) level the more the
influential that political party will be. This can result in an active use of such influence not only
the decisions of bank lending policy but also actively influencing firms through budgetary
perks and regulatory concessions. This paper explores the possibility of concessional lending in
constituencies which are politically aligned with the central government against those which
are represented by politicians who are not part of the governing alliance.

3. The Indian Landscape
3.1 Indian Political System
India follows a dual polity system, i.e. a double government which consists of the central
authority at the center and states at the periphery. The constitution defines the organization
powers and limitations of both central and state governments, and it is well-recognized, rigid
and considered supreme; i.e. laws of the nation must conform to it.

Fig. 1 The Political Structure

Fig. 1 depicts the Indian Political Structure where the Central Government is formed in the
Lok Sabha (Lower House of the parliament) by the party/coalition of parties with two third of
majority. The governments, union or state, are formed through elections held every five years.
Up until 1977 the Indian National Congress dominated the successive elections. India had
its first non-Congress government in 1977. The 1990s saw the end of single party domination
and rise of regional political parties resulting in coalition governments. In recent decades,
Indian politics has become a dynastic affair. Possible reasons for this could be the absence of
party organizations and independent civil society. The increasing bargaining power of regional
political parties during the last three decades has resulted in them wielding influence on
economic policies of the central government.

3.2 Indian Economy
3.2.1 The Growth Story
Post 1990s economic policy liberalization saw the Indian economy experienced an average
growth rate in the range of 5% to 7% even in the presence of political uncertainty largely due to
political alliances and breakdown of such alliances. As of 2016, the Indian economy became the
6th largest by nominal GDP and 3rd largest in terms of PPP (purchasing power parity).
According to most recent statistics published by the government of India, Services
account for 45.4% of GDP while Industry and agriculture contribute 29.8% and 16.5%
respectively. Most of the industrialization in India is clustered around tier 1 and tier two cities
resulting in disparity in overall economic development. This paper focuses on the industrial
sector which has a contribution of third of the GDP and also employs the same proportion of
working population (approximately 543 million people). Due to these facts the impact of
misallocation or redistribution of resources for political gains can have serious implications on
the economy.

Fig. 2 Corporate sector Stability

Source: RBI Financial Stability Report (2016-2017)

Given the high growth trajectory that the Indian economy is experiencing it is interesting to
look at the factors which lead to instability in the corporate sector. The above graph which is a
stability index constructed based on five major categories which poses as major factors
affecting the stability of the corporate sector. As we can see post 2006-2008 global financial

crisis there is a sharp increase in the instability index and one of the major contributor is the
level of leverage of corporate sector. Given the increasing risk arising from higher levels of
leverage it is just to analyze the political factors which affect availability of financial resources
and whether such channels are misused for political gains.

3.2.2 Banking Sector
The Reserve Bank of India is an autonomous body, with minimal pressure from the
government which regulates the banking sector. The banking system in India experienced two
distinct phases of reforms. In 1969, the government of India nationalized 14 largest commercial
banks. A second dose of nationalization of 6 commercial banks followed in 1980. The stated
reason for the nationalization was to give the government more control of credit delivery. With
this second dose the Indian government controlled 91% of banking business in India. Post 1993
economic reforms many private and foreign banks were allowed to do business in India. By the
second half of the fiscal year 2016, 26 nationalized banks and 14 private banks collectively
account for around 90% of the total credit portfolio and deposits of all scheduled commercial
banks in India.
By 2010 banking in India is generally fairly mature in terms of supply, product range
and reach-even though access in rural India still remains a challenge for the private sector and
foreign banks. In terms of quality of assets and capital adequacy, Indian banks are considered to
have clean, strong and transparent balance sheets relative to other banks in comparable
economies in its region. The latest financial stability report by the Reserve Bank of India (RBI)
asserts that this scenario is likely to change over time. According to this report, by 2016 Rs.
3.4 trillion advances made by the banks have slipped into NPA (non-performing assets)
category, the highest ever in the history of Indian banks. This on the back drop of high
economic growth, raises concerns over the functioning of banks in India and hence a just cause
for a deeper analysis of the causes.

Fig. 3 Non-Performing Assets in the India Banking Sector
Deducing from the figure below, the gross non-performing assets (GNPA) increased to 11.8
percent of total advances made by the public sector banks while that for private sector and
foreign banks is as low as 3.2 and 4.1 percent respectively. If we add the restructured loans to

GNPA, then the total distressed assets account for more than 15 percent of the total advances
in the public sector banking domain.

Source: RBI Financial Stability Report (2016-2017)

4 Data and Empirical Strategy
4.1 Data
The data set for our study has a frequency of annual observations. It spans over six financial
years (2009-2010 and 2014-2015), covering all twenty nine states and seven union territories in
India. Our data on political variable is obtained from the Election Commission of India’s
Election Archive1. This large archive provides detailed data on constituency level statistic for
both Parliamentary (Central Government) as well as Legislative Assembly elections (State
Government) held periodically every five years.
From these datasets we extract information about 1.vote share of political parties in
each state for the parliamentary elections, 2.the political tenure of incumbents at constituency
level and 3.intensity of popular support for the incumbent at constituency level.
We collect the data for state specific controls from Reserve Bank of India (RBI) Database on
Indian Economy 2 and Open Governance database 3 provided by the Government of India.
The Election Archive which consist the election statistics is hosted by the Election Commission of India. The data can be
downloaded from http://eci.nic.in/eci_main1/ElectionStatistics.aspx
1

The Reserve Bank of India (RBI) collates data from different primary sources (government departments like Ministry of
Finance, Agriculture etc.). This database is can be downloaded from https://dbie.rbi.org.in/DBIE/dbie.rbi?site=statistics
2

The demographic census data hosted by the Government of India can be downloaded from
http://opengovernanceindia.org/leapaf/district-wise-population-in-india-2011-census
3

The firm level data on bank loans and other financial indicators were obtained from
Center for Monitoring Indian Economy Pvt. Ltd. (CMIE). This database is built from Annual
Reports, quarterly financial statements and Stock Exchange feeds. The database is normalized
to enable intercompany and inter-temporal comparisons.
We create a structured dataset by using a novel data mitigation process to carryout
causal analysis. The geographical location of firms is mapped by using zip-codes with respect to
locations retrieved from the India Postal Services database on zip codes and locations. Then we
map these locations to their respective state legislative constituencies delimited by the Election
Commission of India. These constituencies are delimited by using population census data
provided by the election commission. According to the 2008 Delimitation Act of Election
Commission, the parliamentary constituencies are created by combining several legislative
constituencies based on the population of that region. We map the legislative constituencies
where the firms are located to their respective Parliamentary constituencies. While carrying
out the mapping of locations, we exclude some parliamentary constituencies where the
administrative districts for the region and constituency are different, since the decision of
whether to finance a project or not by a bank is taken within the administrative district itself.
This also makes sense since the regional head offices of banks are located at each district.

5.1.1 Political Controls
First, to test for the possible alignment effects, we define a binary variable Aligned_state, to
indicate if a state and center are ruled by the same political party or coalition.
𝐴𝑙𝑖𝑔𝑛𝑒𝑑_𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒

,

Equals one if the state and central government are politically aligned, else

zero. The construction of 𝐴𝑙𝑖𝑔𝑛𝑒𝑑_𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒

,

variable may give rise to some concerns. Suppose

that throughout the financial year t, the center and state s are governed by distinct coalitions
that have only a minimal party in common. Despite such a tenuous overlap between the two
coalition governments, we set 𝐴𝑙𝑖𝑔𝑛𝑒𝑑_𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒 , = 1. Fortunately, this concern is misplaced in
the Indian context during the period under review. Between the financial years 2010 to 2015,
the central government was a coalition for the period 2010 to 2013 and from 2014 to 2015.
More so, we test for possible constituency alignment effects by defining a binary
variable Aligned_const, to indicate if a constituency and center are ruled by the same political
party or coalition. Aligned_const , equals one if the constituency is representative, and central
government are politically aligned, else zero.

Additionally, to calculate the vote share of political parties which are part of the
coalition ruling at the central government, we simply add the votes that members belonging to
this alliance received to total polled votes in state s in election year t.
State_vshare

,

=

∑

𝑉𝑝

,

∑ 𝑇𝑉𝑃 ,

Where,
∑

𝑉𝑝

,

is the sum of votes received by all the contestants representing different member

parties of the coalition in state s in election year t.
∑ 𝑇𝑉𝑃 , is total votes polled in the state s in election year t.
Lastly, to capture the political influence of incumbent members, we assume that on
average, the longer a politician has held office, the more influential she is. Hence for incumbent
politician p in constituency j in election year t, we compute the length of her tenure starting
from the election year to observation year. After the Delimitation Act of 20082 many
parliamentary constituencies were redrawn based on population. To factor in these changes, we
have calculated the tenure of a politician from an unchanged constituency from the year 2004 if
the constituency is same till the general elections held in 2014. For the new constituencies, the
measure starts from the year 2009.
Tenure

= Number of years p politician from j constituency has been in power over a period of

,,

time, t.

5.1.2 Firm Specific Controls
The data provided by CMIE consists of firm’s financial performance for the period
under review. To arrive at unbiased estimates, we control for the firm’s size as well as its age
which can directly affect the possibility of it getting loans from a bank.
First, to control for firm size we create a variable 𝐿𝑛 RTA ,

,

which is natural log of

real total assets of firm i at time t. To account for inflation, we convert the total assets to real
total assets by using state s specific GDP deflator where the firm is located for year t.
𝐿𝑛 RTA ,
Where:

,

: Natural log of Real Total Assets of Firm i at time t

𝑅𝑇𝐴 ,

,

=

Total Assets ,

,

GDP_de lator

,

Second, we believe that having a financial track record of the firm increases the
probability of it getting a loan against startups. To measure this probability, we measure the
age of the firm i since its inception to year t .

5.1.3 Other Socio-Economic Controls
Other sets of controls comprises of two more repressors’: Real GDP and population of
state s in year t. Real GDP of states in a year is used as a control for state-level business cycles
to avoid the endogeneity of economic cycle in the election year. There is a possibility that
access to sizable local market might lead to different borrowing patterns depending on local
demand for products. We use the population of state s where the firm i is located to control for
local market size.

Table 1(see Appendix) shows the summary statistics of the variables used

for causal analysis in this study.

5.2 Empirical Strategy
Our basic empirical strategy is to relate the possibility of a firm getting preferential
loans to the aforementioned political factors while controlling for various firm and state specific
factors to obtain unbiased estimates of the effect of different political scenarios on firms
borrowing patterns, and whether such loans affect the productivity of firms in an adverse
manner resulting in possible creation of sunk cost. We measure these effects on borrowings of
firms at time t by using the conditional logistic method (Chamberlain 1980).
To measure these effects, we have created a dummy variable that equals one if the
difference in aggregate loans as reported in a firm’s balance sheet is positive, zero otherwise.
1 𝑖𝑓 𝑑𝑖𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒 𝑖𝑛 𝑎𝑔𝑔𝑟𝑒𝑔𝑎𝑡𝑒 𝑙𝑜𝑎𝑛 𝑎𝑡 𝑡 − 𝑡 > 0
0
In order to estimate the effect of political set up at a given time and region (state and

Loan_dummy , , =

constituency) on the probability of preferential lending, we use binary response model (Probit).
Formally, the basic empirical equation 1 for estimation of state alliance is

Loan_dummy , , = 𝛼 + 𝛿 Aligned_state

+ 𝛽 State_vshare

,

+ 𝛿 (Regime ) + 𝛽 𝐿𝑛 RGDP ,
+ 𝛽 𝐿𝑛 State_pop

,

+ 𝛽 𝐿𝑛 RTA ,

,

+ 𝛽 Tenure

,,

+ 𝛽 𝐿𝑛 Firm_age ,

+ 𝜃 + 𝜃 + 𝜃 +Ɛ ,

We further estimate the effects of constituencies that are represented by politically
aligned representative on the probability of preferential access to loans by using the same
methodology as mentioned above in equation 2
Loan_dummy , , = 𝛼 + 𝛿 Aligned_const , + 𝛽 Win_margin , + 𝛽 Tenure
+ 𝛽 𝐿𝑛 RGDP ,

+ 𝛽 𝐿𝑛 RTA ,

,,

+ 𝛿 (Regime )

+ 𝛽 𝐿𝑛 Firm_age , + 𝛽 𝐿𝑛 District_pop

,

+ 𝜃 + 𝜃 +Ɛ ,
Where, Loan_dummy , , is a binary variable which is equal to one if firm i’s net
borrowing at time t is positive, else it takes the value zero. The subscript j represents type of
loan which is namely Aggregate Bank Loans, Long term and Short term bank loans. Regime is
a dummy variable which takes the value 1 if there was a change in alliance which formed the
central government at time t, else 0. 𝜃 and 𝜃 represent the region and year specific fixed
effects which capture the time invariant

unobserved industry specific characteristics and

unobserved economy wide disturbances. The year fixed effects can be particularly important if
business cycles are partly correlated with election years and general electoral performance of
the alliance ruling the central government. To avoid the heteroscedastic errors as a result of
clustering at constituency or districts, we adjust them for heteroskedasticity by clustering them
at constituency level i.e. by relaxing the usual requirement that the observations be
independent. We estimate the effects at aggregate borrowings by firms and further decompose
these borrowings in long term and short term borrowings to estimate differential effects of
political factors. 𝜃 represents the interaction between Year and Region to control for time
varying regional unobserved characteristic to achieve unbiased estimate .
To avoid the potential endogeneity problem in which borrowing might simultaneously
affect the election results, we regress Loan_dummy , , on lagged election results. To avoid the
simultaneity of increased total assets due to investment undertaken by firms derived from
borrowing, we use one year lag of logged real total assets. Also to remove the possible

+𝜃

endogeneity problem of borrowings by firms in a state and its economic performance, we also
employ one year lagged log of real GDP of that state.
One of the advantage of using a conditional logistic regression or logistic model with
fixed effects is that it implicitly controls for the unobserved heterogeneity. On the other hand,
this method also reduces the problem of self selection and omitted-variable bias to an extent.
The drawback of this method is that the estimated coefficients are not intuitive .We cannot
estimate the probabilities from a conditional model but interpret the coefficients as odds of that
particular event taking place. Cameron and Trivedi (2010) suggested a method to calculate
conditional probability from conditional logistic method but cautioned using these predicted
probabilities to evaluate effects at sample level since these probabilities are conditioned on
positive outs comes within the groups only. To overcome this, we employ a second set of fixed
effects regressions using a sub-sampling method. We regress sales of firms on different
categories of loans separately while controlling for other socio-economic variables. This
regression is run separately for firms located in aligned states and aligned constituencies
separately to evaluate the differential effect. Formally, the empirical model for estimating the
effects of loans on firm’s productivity based on its location is given in equation 3
Ln(Real_Sales) , = 𝛼 + 𝛽 𝐿𝑛 Loan , , + 𝛽 𝐿𝑛 RGDP ,
+ 𝛽 𝐿𝑛 State_pop

,

+ 𝛽 𝐿𝑛 RTA ,

+ 𝛽 𝐿𝑛 Firm_age ,

+ 𝜃 + 𝜃 + 𝜃 +Ɛ ,

Where, Ln(Real_Sales) , is natural log of real sales (inflation adjusted sales) of firm i at time t.
Ln(Loan) , ,

is natural log of loan type j that firm i took at time t. We use the same set of

socio-economic controls and fixed effects from the conditional logistic model to evaluate
consistent estimates for comparison.
Dasgupta et al (2004) find that swing states in India were allocated significantly large
grants from central government compared to states which consistently followed one political
ideology over a period a long time, whereas Cole (2008) find significant increase in agricultural
lending by banks as election year nears. The main hypothesis this study is that the
opportunistic nature of politicians will result in preferential lending by banks to achieve
political goals. The primary utility that a political party derives is from maximizing its presence
in all possible regions. To do so, there is a high possibility that resources are redistributed to

states which are not currently aligned with the central government. The main variables of
interest in our analysis are state and constituency alignment with central government and
regime change. We expect positive effect on probability of borrowing in the states which are
politically aligned with the central government, as they already have such state in their pocket.
On the other hand, we expect positive effect of tenure and aligned constituency as they reflect
more of a politicians efforts to win an election.

5.3 Empirical Results and Discussion
5.3.1 State and Central Government Political Alignment
The regression results of equation 1 estimating the effects of politically aligned states
with the central government are reported in Table 2 (see Appendix). Column 1 through 3 show
the results of our model specification for aggregate, long term and short term loans dummy
variables respectively. We find positive but statistically in-significant effect of a state’s political
alignment on the odds of preferential total borrowings of the firms. We further decompose
aggregate loans in two categories based on the repayment time frame. Loans which have a
repayment period less than 18 months are classified as short term loans and all other loans are
termed as long term loans. We estimate the effects of political landscape on these two subcategories of loans by using equation 1. Both long term and short term loans are positively
affected by political alliance between state and center but the results are statistically
insignificant. One of the political motivations behind the redistribution of resources could be to
increase the foot print or to increase the vote share of the alliance in a given region. We
measure these effects by estimating the effect of vote share in each state of the alliance of
parties which has formed government in center. Our results are in line with the previous
literature (La Porta et al, 2002) and show a positive impact on both long and short term loans,
significant at 5% level. Although the direction of the impact of vote share on aggregate loans is
consistent with the subcategories, it is statistically insignificant.

5.3.2 Constituency and Central Government Political Alignment
India has a federal democratic structure with existence of various national and state
level political parties representing regional and social interests in the society. In such a
complex and dynamic political system, estimation at state level might not reflect the true

significance and magnitude of impacts of varying political landscapes on bank lending. We
carry out further estimation of such impacts by employing the empirical model generated from
equation 2. The results of aligned constituencies are summarized in Table 3 (see Appendix).
The impact of aligned constituencies on long term and short term borrowing is positive
and significant at 1% level. These results are in line with findings by Cole (2009) which
suggests that the government ownership of banks does in fact impacts its lending process. It is
also interesting to see if a longer tenure of a representative results in more influence on the
institutions located in the constituency as suggested by Imai (2009), who finds significant
impact of tenure on influence of institutions in Japan. We do not find evidence of such effect on
aggregate or long term loans. Contrarily, our findings suggest that a longer tenure has positive
and statistically significant impact on short term loans which points towards lending pattern
following the elections cycles at local level in the short term.
The electoral vulnerability of a politician in a given election can be measured by how
much margin she wins the election. The higher the margin, the safe the politician might feel
and hence less motivated to re-allocate resources (Imai, 2009). We find negative impact of
winning margin of a representative on preferential lending by banks in the short term, while
this effect is not significant for long term loans as well as aggregate loans.

5.3.3 Political Alignment and Firm Productivity
In an ideal setup, it is possible to evaluate the impact of probabilities of preferential
lending derived from logistic regression on the productivity of firms which can further throw
light on disadvantages of such practices. As previously noted, it is impossible to derive
probabilities from a conditional logistic regression model to carry out such analysis. To
overcome this drawback, we have used sub-sampling method to differentiate the effects of loans
on firm productivity. Our results of conditional logistic regressions help to establish the link
between political motivations and interference on bank lending practices in India, which
supports our choice of sampling method. The results of equation 3 by using sample defined on
aligned and non-aligned states are summarized in Table 4 (see Appendix).
After controlling for firm specific characteristics and socio-economic determinants, we
find positive impact of long term and short term loans on sales in both aligned and non-aligned
states. The productivity of firms located in aligned states reduces by 2.16% with an increase of

1% in long term loans, keeping other variables constant. The direction of the impact is
consistent for firms located in non-aligned states where a 1% increase in long term loans
reduces sales by 2.86%, suggesting a small productivity loss in aligned states. The magnitude
of the effect of short term loans on the other hand is larger than that for long term loans. We
find that an increase of 1% in short term loans in aligned and non-aligned states results in an
increase of 5.26% and 8.03% in sales respectively, suggesting an average productivity efficiency
loss to the tune of 2.77% . The aggregate effect of long and short term loans clubbed together
is insignificant for firms located in aligned states while that for firm in non-aligned states is
positive and significant at 1% level, with a resultant 7.27% increase in productivity and 1%
increase in total borrowings of the firm, holding all other variables constant. Our results from
these regressions using sub-sampling at aligned and non-aligned regional level clearly suggests
systematic loss of efficiency in terms of utilization of financial resources, thereby supporting the
existing findings estimated from conditional logistic model.
We employ the same model and method specification in equation 3 by using sample
defined on aligned and non-aligned constituencies and the results are summarized in Table 5
(see Appendix). We find no significant impact of aggregate loans on sales of firms located in
either aligned or non-aligned constituencies. Both long term and short term loans affect sales
positively in aligned constituencies, while they have positive but statistically insignificant
impact in non-aligned constituencies. Holding all other variables constant, an increase of 1% in
long term loans results in 3.24% and 5.95% increase in sales of firms located in aligned and
non-aligned constituencies respectively, represented by politically aligned representatives. Our
results are consistent with findings of previous literature (Asher and Novosad, 2015).

5.4 Concluding Remarks
Government ownership of banks is prevalent in many developing countries to this day, as they
support financing of socially desirable projects. The existing literature supports this social
view, with empirical studies of government banks in developing countries tracing consistent
weak institutional structures that results in distribution of scarce capital to politically desirable
projects. To compliment this literature, this paper analyzes both state and constituency level
panel data on bank lending in India from 2010 to 2015 to investigate whether government
ownership of banks results into highly politicized institutions.

This papers main finding is that the odds of preferential access to bank loans are higher
in the politically aligned states and constituencies. Our findings also support the general notion
that increasing tenure of the representatives of ruling party is associated with increased
lending, with such higher leverage consequently resulting in efficiency loss in firm
productivity.
Our results from conditional logistic regression method support the directional effects
from previous literature on the subject matter. Although these estimates points towards the
presence of impact of political dynamics on bank lending, one should be cautious while
interpreting them as we have pointed out earlier that the results obtained from conditional
logit model are not intuitive since unconditional probabilities for the sample cannot be
measured. The possible interpretational strategies that could be applied in such cases would be
to use simplified conditional probabilities or calculate probability of prototype. The accuracy of
these estimation methods with t>2 is unclear, hence we have avoided using these methods.
Further exploration in methods to calculate unconditional sample level probabilities from a
conditional model will greatly enhance causal interpretation of our findings.
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APPENDIX
Table 1: Summary Statistics
VARIABLES
Long Term Loans dummy
Short Term Loans dummy
Aggregate Loans dummy
Tenure (in Years)
Win Margin
State Vote Share
Literacy Rate
Regime
GDP_deflator
Ln Real GDP
Ln( Real Total Assets)
Lag1 Ln Real Total Assets
Lag1 Ln Real GDP
Ln Age
Ln District population
Ln State population
Ln Real Sale
Ln Aggregate Loans
Ln Long term loans
Ln Short Term Loans
Lag 1 Ln Aggregate Loans
Lag 1 Ln Long Term Loans
Lag 1 Ln Short Term Loans

N

MEAN

SD

MIN

MAX

8,252
6,620
4,211
15,906
15,906
15,906
15,906
15,906
15,906
15,906
13,827
12,230
13,255
15,892
15,900
15,906
12,381
5,614
11,039
4,898
5,058
9,972
4,318

0.322
0.286
0.432
4.897
0.136
0.417
0.771
0.167
1.604
12.76
6.866
6.816
12.73
3.074
1.089
4.046
6.232
5.907
4.696
5.340
5.819
4.610
5.289

0.467
0.452
0.495
3.094
0.0959
0.120
0.0747
0.373
0.203
0.698
2.204
2.205
0.696
0.705
0.936
0.902
2.452
2.714
3.017
2.359
2.714
3.006
2.357

0
0
0
1
0.000434
0
0.470
0
1.209
9.043
-2.714
-2.714
9.043
0
-2.012
-1.415
-2.942
-2.303
-2.303
-2.303
-2.303
-2.303
-2.303

1
1
1
12
0.562
0.688
0.939
1
2.120
13.76
14.76
14.68
13.71
5.024
2.403
5.296
14.97
12.89
13.40
12.41
12.89
13.34
12.41

Table 2: Equation 1 Results: Effects of State and Center Political Alliance
VARIABLES
Aligned State
State Vote Share of Alliance
Tenure
Lagged Ln Real GDP
Lagged Ln Real Total Assets
Ln Age
Regime
Literacy Rate
Observations
Number of DST
District FE
State FE
Year FE

(1)
Aggregate Loans

(2)
Long Term Loans

-0.301
-0.153
(0.184)
(0.191)
0.740
1.637**
(0.751)
(0.786)
0.0340*
0.0270
(0.0205)
(0.0210)
-14.20***
-13.32***
(3.699)
(3.772)
0.236***
0.238***
(0.0178)
(0.0182)
-0.0392
-0.120**
(0.0483)
(0.0492)
0.556***
0.442***
(0.116)
(0.121)
9.750***
8.929***
(1.791)
(1.797)
4,141
4,084
120
109
YES
YES
YES
YES
YES
YES
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

(3)
Short Term Loans
-0.0117
(0.192)
1.994**
(0.787)
0.0779***
(0.0214)
-10.11***
(3.870)
0.191***
(0.0182)
0.297***
(0.0511)
1.249***
(0.139)
14.07***
(1.987)
4,117
116
YES
YES
YES

Table 3: Equation 2 Results: Effects of Constituency and Center Political
Alliance
VARIABLES
Aligned Constituency
Win margin
Tenure
Lagged Ln Real GDP
Lagged Ln RTA
Ln Age
Regime
Ln District Population
Literacy Rate
Observations
Number of DST
District FE
State FE
Year FE

(1)
Aggregate Loans

(2)
Long Term Loans

0.285
0.493***
(0.180)
(0.188)
-0.828
-0.890
(0.587)
(0.604)
0.0257
0.0114
(0.0210)
(0.0216)
-11.99***
-12.06***
(3.442)
(3.521)
0.237***
0.241***
(0.0178)
(0.0183)
-0.0386
-0.123**
(0.0484)
(0.0493)
0.583***
0.441***
(0.118)
(0.123)
0.0740
-0.142
(0.174)
(0.175)
9.364***
8.800***
(1.817)
(1.827)
4,141
4,084
120
109
YES
YES
YES
YES
YES
YES
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

(3)
Short Term Loans
0.393**
(0.188)
-1.651***
(0.613)
0.0719***
(0.0220)
-9.854***
(3.608)
0.193***
(0.0183)
0.302***
(0.0512)
1.295***
(0.142)
0.123
(0.180)
13.37***
(2.008)
4,117
116
YES
YES
YES

Table 4: Equation 3 Results: State level Sub-Sampling

VARIABLES
ln Aggregate Loans

(1)
Ln Real Sales
-0.000205
(0.0198)

ln Long Term Loans

ln Firm Age
L.ln Real GDP
ln State Population
Literacy Rate
Observations
Number of CMIE
Year FE
State FE

(3)
Ln Real Sales

(1)
Log Real Sales
0.0727***
(0.0150)

-0.0216**
(0.00953)

ln Short Term
Loans
L.ln Real Total
Assets

Aligned State
(2)
Ln Real Sales

Non-Aligned State
(2)
(3)
Log Real Sales
Log Real Sales

-0.0286**
(0.0128)
0.0526***
(0.0117)

0.797***
(0.0348)
0.365***
(0.0434)
0.848
(0.708)
-0.0814
(0.0624)
0.0165
(1.003)
2,364
869
YES
YES

0.818***
0.708***
0.727***
(0.0351)
(0.0382)
(0.0401)
0.351***
0.202***
0.395***
(0.0422)
(0.0457)
(0.127)
0.766
0.377
0.127
(0.690)
(0.618)
(0.766)
-0.0938
-0.0659
-0.744
(0.0611)
(0.0620)
(2.033)
0.0223
0.778
1.813
(0.999)
(0.687)
(1.651)
2,362
1,830
1,508
868
686
570
YES
YES
YES
YES
YES
YES
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

0.0803***
(0.0179)
0.820***
(0.0451)
0.353***
(0.127)
0.185
(0.803)
-0.798
(1.895)
2.084
(1.611)
1,505
567
YES
YES

0.694***
(0.0423)
0.168**
(0.0681)
0.678
(0.744)
-1.946
(2.003)
1.783
(1.906)
1,220
469
YES
YES

Table 5: Equation 3 Results: Constituency level Sub-Sampling

VARIABLES
Ln Aggregate Loans
Ln Long Term Loans
Ln Short Term Loans
Lagged Ln Real Total
Assets
Ln Age
Lagged Ln Real GDP
Ln Population
Literacy Rate
Constant

Observations
Number of CMIE
Year FE
State FE

Aligned Constituencies
(1)
(2)
(3)
Log Real Sales Log Real Sales Log Real Sales
0.0205
(0.0268)
-0.0324***
(0.0105)
0.0595***
(0.0145)
0.758***
(0.0274)
0.356***
(0.0525)
0.907
(0.715)
-17.14**
(7.087)
0.401
(1.350)
65.37**
(25.82)
2,801
921
YES
YES

0.807***
(0.0308)
0.337***
(0.0536)
0.912
(0.708)
0.0179
(0.109)
0.453
(1.362)
-10.93
(9.421)

0.686***
(0.0310)
0.190***
(0.0538)
0.617
(0.741)
-12.60**
(6.204)
1.634
(1.606)
49.08**
(19.90)

Non-Aligned Constituencies
(1)
(2)
(3)
Log Real Sales Log Real Sales Log Real Sales
0.0156
(0.0318)
-0.0121
(0.0150)
0.0420
(0.0301)
0.838***
(0.0737)
0.443***
(0.0992)
0.455
(1.020)
-3.746
(6.226)
2.027**
(0.994)
8.987
(15.41)

2,800
2,210
1,071
921
737
430
YES
YES
YES
YES
YES
YES
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

0.866***
(0.0533)
0.427***
(0.0998)
0.433
(1.045)
-0.104
(0.105)
2.075**
(0.984)
-6.945
(13.69)

0.755***
(0.0795)
0.165*
(0.0888)
0.0352
(0.888)
-0.171
(5.476)
1.577**
(0.771)
0.0498
(13.59)

1,067
428
YES
YES

840
345
YES
YES

